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Engagement: Looking beyond the mirror to understand action understanding 
Abstract
In this paper we argue that the current focus on mirroring as the route to explaining 
the development of action understanding is misleading and problematic. It facilitates a 
fundamentally spectatorial stance, ignoring engagement and dialogue; it focuses on
similarity between self and other and neglects difference; and it succumbs to the static 
terminology of mechanism rather than a dynamic language of process. Contrary to 
this view, dialogic exchanges are evident from the start of life, revealing the infants’
ability to engage with and respond appropriately to actions that are outside their own 
motor repertoire. We suggest that engagement rather than mirroring better accounts 
for many current findings in action understanding. The neurological evidence to date 
shows that action perception involves a process of continuous synchronisation and 
change, suggesting that it might be more fruitful for research and theory to look 
beyond mirroring and instead adopt dynamic processual explanations of action 
understanding within interaction. 
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Introduction
The argument that infants’ understanding of others’ actions originates in infants’ own 
action capabilities (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Woodward & Gerson, 2014) is both 
cogent and consistent with the majority of current views in developmental 
neuroscience. In essence, the argument is that the neural systems that underpin
infants’ own actions are strongly connected to, and indeed drive, infants’ ‘analysis’ of 
others’ actions. This claim appears to be both strongly supported by current evidence 
and logically unimpeachable. If action is prospectively controlled (and there is good 
reason to believe that it is) then there must be ‘abstract’ intentional (and prospective) 
relations between goal and own movement which, when present, must also be 
available to infants when they perceive others’ movements in relation to potential 
goals. The claim is heavily grounded in neuroscience with discoveries of mirror 
mechanisms allowing the perception of intentional relations in others’ actions on the 
basis of own action production. In all, despite some recent criticisms1, the claim 
seems compelling. So why is it problematic?
The problem becomes clear when one realises that there are at least three ways 
in which infants are exposed to others’ actions. The infant could merely observe the 
frequent occurrence of an action by the other without involvement. The infant could
observe the similarity of an action by the other to that within the infant’s repertoire. 
The infant could feel and produce a response to an action by the other which is 
1 Recent criticisms of the mirroring theory of action understanding have argued that mirroring is in fact 
a byproduct of associative learning (Heyes, 2010), and not necessary for action understanding 
(Hamilton, 2009; Hickok, 2009). 
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directed to the infant – even in the absence of the capacity to produce the original 
action.  
The received interpretation of mirror mechanisms in action understanding –
the direct-matching hypothesis (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) – proposes that 
by mapping the observation of another’s action onto one’s own motor repertoire, a 
first person experience of the observed action is created (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010). This means that although action mirroring can be embedded in interaction, it 
need not be. And while producing a similar action (i.e. imitation) may be based on 
action mirroring, producing a different response falls outside of the scope of such a 
mechanism. 
In this paper we take issue with the claim that infants’ capacity to understand 
an action is dependent on their capacity to produce the same action for three reasons: 
First, the claim is, despite the best intentions of its proponents, fundamentally
spectatorial. The crucial feature in such a first-person or third-person account2 is the 
infant’s perception of the similarity of the other’s action to an action in her own 
repertoire. The infant is still an observer and analyser of the action, not necessarily a 
participant with it. 
2 Discussions about knowing other minds note the spectatorial stance implied by both first person and 
third person accounts (Costall, 2013; Leudar & Costall, 2009). In both, the knower is fundamentally an 
observer of the other mind. In first person accounts the knowing is accomplished through either explicit 
analogy with the self or implicit simulation of the other within the self. In third person accounts the 
knowing is accomplished through deduction and theory applied to the observed behaviour. Both adopt 
a Cartesian rather than a Hegelian view of knowing (I. Markova, 1982), in which the knower is 
independent of that which is known.
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Second, dialogue between self and other needs difference – not identity – to be 
meaningful. Although neither similarity nor difference are absolute or categorical 
entities, mirroring explanations focus on similarity between self and other, while 
action understanding within dialogue would require us to focus on infant actions as 
responses to difference. 
Third, mirroring explanations incline towards a focus on mechanism and static 
representation (i.e. a dedicated mechanism that produces a mental or motor 
representation similar to the one present in the observed actor). We argue that 
understanding action is a more fluid and dynamic process, without a pre-defined and 
clear endpoint. Cognitive neuroscience and developmental science are better off 
focusing on the role motor resonance plays in enabling the organism to respond to 
relevant features, and to engage in dialogue with it, than on the static recognition of 
isolated actions. Before we discuss evidence that action understanding is not best 
interpreted solely in terms of mirroring, we briefly discuss the (largely 
neuroscientific) background of the current interpretation.
From neurons to mechanism
As is widely known, mirror neurons were first discovered in area F5 of the ventral 
premotor cortex of macaque monkeys. Monkeys were seated with their heads and 
bodies fixed while watching objects being picked up, and grasping these objects 
themselves. Single neurons appeared to be selectively activated not only when the 
monkey grasped the object, but also when the experimenter grasped it. Di Pellegrino 
and colleagues hypothesized that “the actions performed by other monkeys must be a 
very important factor in determining action selection”, explicitly relating their 
findings to response generation and social interaction. Fairly soon, however, the role 
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attributed to these neurons shifted from action selection to action understanding
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996) and ‘mind reading’ (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), and mirror neurons were
hypothesized to be the neural instantiation of a simulation of the observed action in a 
motor format (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011; Goldman, 2006). This move from action 
selection to action understanding strongly facilitates an interpretation in terms of 
passive observation rather than active involvement.
As it is hard to establish mirroring at the single cell level in humans (but see 
Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010), the word ‘mirror neuron’ was 
generally omitted when discussing human motor activation during action observation. 
Instead, the notion of ‘mirror system’ or ‘mirror mechanism’ (Rizzolatti et al., 2001)
provides a more neutral term to account for the activation of motor areas during 
action observation (including the ventral premotor cortex, and the rostral part of the 
intraparietal lobule, with the posterior superior temporal sulcus being its main visual 
input (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). By referring to these areas as the ‘mirror system’, 
or implementing a ‘mirror mechanism’, claims about the exact implementation at the 
single cell level are avoided. Although this agnosticism is praiseworthy, the particular
notions of ‘system’ and ‘mechanism’ implied here do involve a crucial conceptual 
step: they suggest a confined entity that has the purpose of accomplishing a specific
task: a mechanism for understanding others. Thus was born the idea of a dedicated 
mechanism for understanding observed actions by mapping them onto the observer’s 
own motor repertoire. Since premotor areas are part of this action observation system, 
activation in these areas is easily interpreted as instantiating simulation of the 
observed actions. Indeed, TMS (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995), fMRI 
(Buccino et al., 2001), MEG (Hari et al., 1998), and mu-suppression based EEG 
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paradigms (Cochin, Barthelemy, & Roux, 1999) showed activation in premotor and 
motor areas during action observation, and were interpreted within the framework of 
action understanding. 
The idea of a mirror mechanism rapidly found its way into developmental 
science. As the motor repertoire develops during infancy, the resulting framework 
generates testable hypotheses for the development of action understanding. And 
indeed, previous motor experience alters perceptions of others’ actions. Sommerville 
and colleagues (2005) showed that 3-month-olds who are given artificial motor 
experience of reaching and grasping – in contrast to 3-month-olds not given such 
experience – can detect the goal-directedness of the reaches of a disembodied adult 
arm. Woodward and colleagues (2002) were able to directly link age-related motor 
production abilities with perception of motor acts. This link was further established 
using eye tracking and EEG studies (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Cannon & Woodward, 
2012; Daum, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2011; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). 
In all, the evidence seems strongly in favour of the hypothesis that 
understanding patterns and meanings in others’ actions comes from having such 
patterns and meanings in one’s own actions, with the idea of a dedicated action 
mirroring system that develops with the observer’s motor skills leaving little room for 
a different interpretation. Yet, there are reasons for re-thinking the developmental 
evidence and looking beyond the mirror for explanations of the development of action 
understanding.
The importance of engagement: self and other as participants not spectators 
Our predominant social experience in the first year of life comes from situations 
where we are directly involved and often the direct recipients of others’ actions and 
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utterances. At any point in our lives, actions directed to us put us immediately in a 
difference pragmatic frame where a response of some sort – even if only to ignore the 
action – is demanded of us. They also involve us in an immediately emotional relation 
– arousing interest, dislike, attraction, joy, pain, indifference and so on. Although in 
older children and adults such emotional involvement can occur in spectators too – as 
in watching movies – they are far more typical of direct interactions and, we argue, 
developmentally crucial in early infancy.  
Various neuroscientific studies have shown that being a recipient rather than 
an observer makes a difference to neural responses (Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003; 
Schilbach, Eickhoff, Mojzisch, & Vogeley, 2008; Schilbach et al., 2006). Performing
an action – even one as simple as looking at a stimulus on a screen together with 
someone - affects brain activation (Hoehl, Michel, Reid, Parise, & Striano, 2014). 
Joint looking evokes activity in a brain area argued to be involved in thinking about 
mental states, while solo looking does not (Schilbach et al., 2013). Interpersonal 
engagement reaches into the future as well: not only do the actions of a partner in a 
game cause greater motor activation than the actions of a non-partner (Kourtis, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010), but observation of the actions of people with whom you 
have previously interacted produces greater sensorimotor activation than observation 
of the actions of people you haven’t interacted with (Kourtis, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 
2013). At the simplest level, it seems that being engaged with another person in some 
way – whether by being called, being looked at, being smiled at or by doing (or 
having done) simple actions with them – has a fundamental impact on brain
responses. 
Engagement also leads to different neural activation in infants. Direct gaze to 
4 and 5 month olds evokes early and increased gamma band activity compared to 
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averted gaze (Grossmann, Johnson, Farroni, & Csibra, 2007) and enhanced pre-
frontal cortex activity (Grossmann, Parise, & Friederici, 2010). Using ERP studies, 
Farroni and colleagues (2004) found that in 4 month olds cortical processing of direct 
gaze is enhanced even when the face is averted; and there is better recognition of 
(upright) faces with direct gaze than with averted gaze (Farroni, Massaccesi, Menon, 
& Johnson, 2007). Mutual gaze also enhances the possibility of learning about the 
world and the processing of objects (Parise, Reid, Stets, & Striano, 2008; Reid, 
Striano, Kaufman, & Johnson, 2004) and the neural processing of facial expressions
(Striano, Kopp, Grossmann, & Reid, 2006). Prior mutual gaze enhances faster 
saccades to the peripheral targets of others’ gaze even in neonates (Farroni et al., 
2004) and gaze following in 6 month olds (Senju & Csibra, 2008). Being addressed in 
one way or another is also directly ‘preferred’ by adults (Schnell, Bluschke, Konradt, 
& Walter, 2011) and by infants: two to five day old infants already look preferentially 
at frontal photographs of faces in which the eyes are oriented forwards (looking at the 
infant) than those in which the eyes are averted to the side (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & 
Johnson, 2002), also when using schematic faces (Farroni et al., 2004). 
Together these findings suggest that that the phenomenon of being addressed 
is developmentally crucial and has broader implications than simply the detection of 
ostensive cues as argued by some (Csibra, 2007) – it draws the infant further into 
emotional involvement with the other and the other’s interests, rather than only into 
analysing and interpreting the other’s behaviour as cues. The findings converge on the 
idea that social cognition is not just normal cognition with more complexity added. 
Rather, they show that our brains are deeply social, and that a social setting alters 
even the most basic processes. Most of these findings focus on being addressed by 
gaze; being addressed by actions is likely to be much harder to avoid noticing and 
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responding to and also shows increased brain activity in the relevant regions (Nagels, 
Kircher, Steines, & Straube, 2015). The world of new-born and very young infants is 
particularly full of actions performed by adults upon or towards their faces, limbs, 
mouths and bottoms. 
Dialogue needs difference not similarity  
The infant’s engagement with adults from birth has a dialogic character (Bateson, 
1979; Trevarthen, 1977), revealing reciprocal interactions with mutual adaptation to 
each other’s actions and orientations. From at least two months of age infants are 
capable of perceiving the temporal and affective contingencies between their own 
actions and orientations and others’ responses (Bigelow, 1998; G. Markova & 
Legerstee, 2006; McQuaid, Bibok, & Carpendale, 2009; Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, 
Marcelli, & Réserbat Plantey, 1999; Reddy, Chisholm, Forrester, Conforti, & 
Maniatopoulou, 2007). Such contingencies must also be perceivable in the reverse 
direction – that is, the relatedness of their own responses to others’ actions must also 
be perceptually manifest.
Dialogue needs a responsive voice – a different ‘other’ – in order to develop, 
not similarity. As Buber put it (Friedman, 1955) “Though the Thou is not an It, it is 
also not “another I.” He who treats a person as “another I” does not really see that 
person but only a projected image of himself.” Even at 3 months infants prefer 
contingent responses to their own initiatives to be appropriate but different, rather 
than direct imitations of their acts (G. Markova & Legerstee, 2006). In other words, to 
engage with another dialogically, you do need a different other. The complex 
embeddedness of infant actions in participatory dialogues from the early months is 
evident in face to face as well as care-taking and other playful interactions (Nadel et 
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al., 1999; Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2013; Rossmanith et al., 2014), with infants not only 
responding to the adult acts they receive, but receiving further adult actions in 
response to their own acts.
From the first moments of life, the majority of infant experiences of others’ 
actions are of adults performing actions on them which the infant cannot possibly 
accomplish: holding the legs to lift the bottom, wiping the eyes, cleaning the nose, 
stroking the face, putting the arm in a sleeve, holding the chest to lift the baby up and 
so on. Most of these actions are not part of the infant’s action repertoire, but infants 
do respond to them, often emotionally and appropriately. From a mirroring 
perspective, such adult actions to the infant would be either irrelevant or 
incomprehensible to the infant. However, the few studies that exist which test actions 
directed to the infant suggest that there is a lot more understanding going on in the 
early months than can be explained by mirroring. Habituation studies of action 
awareness – considered to be less cognitively demanding than studies of ‘on-line’ 
anticipatory responses (Cannon & Woodward, 2012) – show the earliest infant 
awareness by 5 months of age (Woodward, 1998) or 3 months with action training 
(Somerville, Woodward & Needham, 2005). Studies using measures of anticipation 
show their earliest effects at 6 months of age (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Kanakogi & 
Itakura, 2011). In all these studies, however, the infant was a mere spectator of adult 
actions directed to a distal object. Studies of actions where the infant is the recipient
of the action yield earlier evidence of action awareness. By at least two months of age 
infants adjust their bodies by increasing its rigidity and by opening their arms when 
adults extend their arms to pick them up (Reddy, Markova, & Wallot, 2013). Infants 
at 2 and 3 months cannot yet reach out with both arms in anything like the pick-up 
gesture, yet have little difficulty anticipating and adjusting to its specific meaning. In 
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pre-school children with autism, on the other hand, where there is little difficulty with 
reaching out, anticipatory adjustments to being picked up have been reported to be 
absent or problematic (Kanner, 1943) suggesting that such anticipations may be 
connected to the perception of intentionality of actions. Similarly, unlike the 
anticipatory mouth opening of typically developing infants being fed with a spoon or 
indeed from a bottle or breast, children with autism do not open their mouths in 
anticipation of the approaching spoon (Brisson, Warreyn, Serres, Foussier, & Adrien, 
2012) 3. Further, at 2 and 3 months anticipation of being picked up occurs with
constant gaze to the mother’s face rather than to her hands or away (Reddy et al., 
2013), suggesting that this is not merely the anticipation of an impersonal event but of 
the action of a person (see Bruner, 1974 for a similar interpretation of the distinction 
between ‘giving’ with gaze to the hand and ‘giving’ with gaze to the other’s face). 
Our argument is that the infant’s responses both reveal and further build the infant’s 
understanding of the adult’s pick up act; the response itself illuminates and co-creates 
the meaning of the act. The mirroring framework has nothing to say about such clear 
instances of infant action understanding, as the observed action cannot be mapped 
onto the motor repertoire of the infant. 
Neonatal imitation studies offer the richest (as well as the most controversial) 
source of experimental data about infant responses to actions towards themselves. 
Debates continue about whether the infants’ ‘imitative’ responses to the actions 
3 One could object that preparing for the pick-up or the approaching spoon is not really understanding 
of the action, but a mere prediction of what will happen, and an associated response. But notice that the 
highly studied ‘target prediction’ – usually cast in terms of “goal understanding” – is just as easily 
explained in terms of predictions and associations (see Uithol & Paulus, 2013; Uithol, van Rooij, 
Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011).
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modelled by adults extend beyond tongue protrusion, whether they are really 
‘imitative’, and how one can explain the processes involved in it (see for instance 
Jones, 2009). Nonetheless, one key point of interest is the nature of the engagement
involved in these interactions. Three sets of studies from three different laboratories 
attest to the conversational nature of the exchanges. Infants attend intently to facial 
actions directed towards them by adults, but not all attentive infants perform 
‘imitations’, and those that do, do so with a range of patterns – from single actions to 
a series of acts either with increasing or decreasing proficiency (Kugiumutzakis, 
1998). These imitative acts may also be anticipations of or invitations to the model to 
perform, also occurring (with infant gaze to the model) when the model is still and is
no longer modelling the act (Meltzoff & Keith Moore, 1994; Nagy & Molnar, 2004). 
As with adults (see Dumas, Martinerie, Soussignan, & Nadel, 2012) even with very 
young infants, the role of model and imitator can be hard to tell apart. It has been 
argued that even imitative interactions are not merely imitative and that the actions 
themselves are never identical to those observed (Csibra, 2007). They often involve 
varying degrees of approximation and varying degrees of hesitation and change: 
responses to, rather than mimicking of, another person; unless done robotically, 
imitation is always a response (Uzgiris, 1981). Neonatal imitation can provide strong 
evidence of motor resonance and offer an explanation of how the infant recognises the 
similarity between actions observed and actions produced. However, regardless of 
one’s take on it as imitation, these exchanges provide even stronger evidence of the 
neonate’s interest in engaging with actions directed towards them and in ongoing 
dialogic interactions with others.
We offer one further example as evidence of appropriate responses by infants 
to acts outside of their own repertoire: infant laughter to deliberate, infant-directed 
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acts of absurdity and silliness by adults. Adults engage in a range of acts to amuse 
babies – and the earliest successful acts tend to be absurd facial expressions and 
abruptly ending tones or repetitive sounds like ‘brr-ing’ the lips’ (Sroufe & Wunsch, 
1972). From around 3 or 4 months of age infants can produce deep belly laughs to a 
range of adult acts directed towards them. Adult attempts at clowning tend to be 
wrapped up in a framework of smiling and laughter (Mireault et al., 2012) which is 
likely to be emotionally reassuring. Nonetheless, the adult acts that elicit such 
reactions and anticipations from infants can be entirely outside the infant’s own motor 
repertoire. The intention and ‘meaning’ of these adult acts comes from the infant’s 
own affective response to them and the ensuing dialogue, not from the motor 
resonance of the acts themselves (see also the affective embeddedness of joint 
attentional acts; Leavens et al., 2014).
Engagement affords a broader and relational level of explanatory framework 
of current findings than does mirroring. It accounts for learning from the experience 
of observed actions that are outside the infant’s own repertoire as well as from those
within; it accounts for perceived meaningfulness of observed actions under situations 
of motor constraint (Csibra, 2007); it accounts for findings that observational 
experience sensitises infants – they attend more specifically to specific features of 
pets if they have experience of pets at home, a finding that doesn’t extend to human 
faces (Hurley & Oakes, 2015); and it accounts for findings showing selective 
mirroring (Caggiano et al., 2012). 
Arguments about the primacy of engagement in the development of mind 
knowledge (Reddy, 2003; 2008; 2011) claim that being directly addressed by ‘other 
minds’ is necessary for  typical social cognition. They posit a gradually expanding 
awareness of aspects of mind emerging from direct experience with them in second-
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person interactions. Thus, another’s attention directed to her allows the infant to 
experience attention and response by being the object of attention, before she can 
grasp the meaning of others’ attention directed to other objects. From a simple grasp 
of attention directed to self, the infant comes to understand attention to other objects –
to parts of the infant’s body within the first six months (such as in action games on the 
infant’s hands and feet) to the infant’s own actions from around 7 or 8 months of age 
(such as repeating funny faces or sounds or movements to re-elicit adult attention or 
laughter) before it can include objects in distal space between 9 and 12 months of age 
(such as following gaze to distal targets, and pointing). Similarly, understanding the 
goal-directedness of intentional actions, it is predicted, emerges from being the goal 
of others’ intentional actions from the start of life. This experience, we argue, forms 
the basis upon which understanding goal-directedness to other objects emerges –
grasping actions directed towards other objects and grasping adults’ intentions to 
modify the infant’s own actions (Heimann & Uithol, 2015; Reddy, 2015; Reddy et 
al., 2013).
These views predict that difficulties in atypical development stem partly from 
earlier difficulties in second person interactions, as well as predictions about the 
primacy of second person engagements in typical development. Neonatal imitation for 
instance, should be easier to obtain when the model addresses the infant with the act 
than when the act is simply witnessed, addressed to no one. Understanding the goal of 
a reach (when witnessing someone reach for an object, for instance) should not be 
easy to grasp if you have never been reached for yourself. Typical conceptual and 
inferential understanding of attention and goal-directedness must come from these 
experiences of being the object or goal. 
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Action understanding is a dynamic process  
In her critique of mirror system explanations of action understanding, Southgate 
(2013) argues that action production experience may provide better learning 
opportunities than action observation alone (suggesting that the absence of learning 
opportunities in a merely observed action, rather than absence of motor activation, is 
key to not understanding it). She argues that action production might lead to better 
learning about the goal object of the action (such as object names; Yu & Smith, 
2012), better retention of its information consequences (Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 
2014) and possibly greater arousal. While her departure from mirror-based 
explanations of action understanding is a great leap forward, we believe her 
alternative still suffers from the spectatorial ghost that haunts the debate, framing her 
explanation in terms of cues and prediction. What her alternative does not quite touch 
on is that most infant action production experiences occur within pragmatic frames 
and long engagement histories, not only sensitizing infants to the specific actions of 
others but also drawing them into the contexts in which these actions make sense. By 
seeking a processual rather than a mechanistic explanation, various strands of 
cognitive science offer sources for an alternative interpretation of the finding of 
mirror neurons and motor resonance. 
First, field theory (Lewin, 1951) and Gibsonian approaches have offered 
strong arguments for thinking of psychological phenomena in terms of process rather 
than mechanism. In their rejection of an animal-environment dualism they posited
action fields with pre-existing or ongoing sociocultural tuning processes, avoiding the 
more typical analytic focus on representations, and on moments of ‘here and now 
givenness’ (Kadar & Effken, 2005). Such a processual view steers interpretation away 
from the infant as analyser of observed action, towards a framework in which infant 
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and actor engage in an action dialogue, through which understanding and meaning is 
created. 
Second, dynamic systems theory offers a non-representational account of 
cognitive processes, focusing on processes that are dynamically linked to other 
processes (Beer, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Instead of postulating an internal 
mental state that is causally responsible for the subsequent behaviour, this approach 
seeks the causes of behaviour in the interaction of various control processes both 
within and outside of the central nervous system, in dynamic interaction with external 
factors (Schurger & Uithol, 2015; Shenoy, Kaufman, Sahani, & Churchland, 2011).
For action understanding, instead of inferring a mental state that could be responsible 
for the observed action (see Uithol, Burnston, & Haselager, 2014 for problems with 
this framework), understanding consists of ongoing prediction and response 
generation within interaction.
Third, enactivism highlights the fact that cognition did not evolve for creating 
faithful representations about the external world, but to allow the organism to act 
appropriately. That is, mind is seen not as inhering in the individual, but as emerging 
and existing dynamically in the relationship between organisms and their 
surroundings (including other agents; McGann, De Jaegher, & Di Paolo, 2013). It is 
recognized that the interaction process itself forms an irreducible domain of dynamics 
which can be constitutive of individual agency (De Jaegher & Froese, 2009).
According to Di Paolo and De Jaegher’s ‘Interactive Brain Hypothesis’, (2012) when 
an individual interacts with others, the interaction processes would not function 
merely as perceptual input to ready-made mechanisms but would also play a role in 
shaping brain mechanisms for social interaction.
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Each of these approaches enables interpreting motor activation during action 
observation not merely in terms of ‘resonance’ (i.e. evoking the same motor 
representation in the observer), but in terms of interaction (Dumas, 2014) and 
participation in the creation of meaning. This mutual adaptation results in 
interactional synchrony to which both members contribute (Dumas, Nadel, 
Soussignan, Martinerie, & Garnero, 2010). Next, these approaches predict that motor 
activation during action observation is not automatic and stable, but can be influenced 
by a variety of factors, most notably the interaction and the actor. This prediction is 
indeed supported by a volley of findings on both infants and adults. Hoehl and 
colleagues (2014) found desynchronisation in the alpha frequency range in nine-
month-old infants when looking at an object together with an adult during a social 
interaction involving eye contact. Interestingly, when infant and experimenter only 
looked at the object without engaging in eye contact, no such effect was observed. In 
adults, Oberman and colleagues (2007) showed that the mu-frequency is modulated 
by the degree of social interaction. Being the addressee of an action results in the 
largest suppression. Finally, motor resonance is response-dependent. Newman-
Norlund et al. (2007) found greater activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus and 
the bilateral intraparietal lobules (areas typically associated with action mirroring) 
when participants had to perform a complementary action compared to an imitative 
action.
We interpret these findings as strong support for a process view of action 
understanding. Thinking in process terms forces us to recognise something ongoing 
rather than a snapshot, something changing and developing rather than static, and 
something open to experience rather than pre-determined. Our point here is that the 
phenomena of action understanding (both at behavioural and neural levels) are 
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fundamentally emergent, contextual, open to experience and subject to change within 
engagement. Thus, thinking of action understanding itself as a process is different 
from thinking of it as a mechanism, and opens us up to different methods, evidence 
and explanations of action understanding.  
Conclusion
We have argued that the current focus on mirroring as the route to explaining the 
development of action understanding is misleading and problematic. Instead, we 
believe that the predominant state of being is relational and involved or engaged, and 
that any complete account of (the development of) action understanding must take 
this engagement into account. If we treat interaction as a special case of actions, we 
are missing out on grasping a key source of experiences for infants’ understanding of 
others’ actions. When we move beyond the mirror and start viewing interaction as the 
more basic setting for social cognition and exposure to actions, we open our eyes to 
different methods, evidence and explanations. Action understanding takes place in a 
context of interaction in which meaning and sense-making emerge from an ongoing 
dialogic engagement.
References 
Ambrosini, E., Reddy, V., de Looper, A., Costantini, M., Lopez, B., & Sinigaglia, C. 
(2013). Looking Ahead: Anticipatory Gaze and Motor Ability in Infancy. Plos 
One, 8(7), e67916. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067916 
20 
Bateson, M. C. (1979). The epigenesist of conversational interaction: A personal 
account of research development. In M. Bullowa, Before Speech The beginning 
of human communication (pp. 63–77). London. 
Beer, R. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 4(3), 91–99. 
Begus, K., Gliga, T., & Southgate, V. (2014). Infants Learn What They Want to 
Learn: Responding to Infant Pointing Leads to Superior Learning. Plos One, 
9(10), e108817. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0108817 
Bigelow, A. E. (1998). Infants’ sensitivity to familiar imperfect contingencies in 
social interaction. Infant Behavior and Development, 21(1), 149–162. 
Brisson, J., Warreyn, P., Serres, J., Foussier, S., & Adrien, J.-L. (2012). Motor 
Anticipation Failure in Infants With Autism: a Retrospective Analysis of 
Feeding Situations. Autism, 16(4), 420–429. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1362361311423385 
Bruner, J. S. (1974). From communication to language—a psychological perspective. 
Cognition, 3(3), 255–287. http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(74)90012-2 
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G. R., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., et al. 
(2001). Action observation activates premotor and parietal areas in a 
somatotopic manner: an fMRI study. European Journal of Neuroscience, 13(2), 
400–404. 
Caggiano, V., Fogassi, L., Rizzolatti, G., Casile, A., Giese, M. A., & Thier, P. (2012). 
Mirror neurons encode the subjective value of an observed action. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences. 
21 
Cannon, E. N., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action 
predictions. Developmental Science, 15(2), 292–298. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01127.x 
Cochin, S., Barthelemy, C., & Roux, S. (1999). Observation and execution of 
movement: similarities demonstrated by quantified electroencephalography. 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 1839–1842. 
Costall, A. (2013). Things that help us make what we are. In G. Sammut, P. Daanen, 
& F. M. Mofhaddam, Understanding the Self and Others Explorations in 
Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity (pp. 66–67). Abingdon. 
Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action interpretation: An alternative account. 
In P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, & M. Kawato, Sensorimotor Foundations of Higher 
Cognition. Attention and Performance XXII (pp. 427–451). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Daum, M. M., Prinz, W., & Aschersleben, G. (2011). Perception and production of 
object-related grasping in 6-month-olds. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 108(4), 810–818. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2010.10.003 
De Jaegher, H., & Froese, T. (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual 
Agency. Adaptive Behavior, 17(5), 444–460. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1059712309343822 
Di Paolo, E. A. (2012). The interactive brain hypothesis. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6(163), 1–16. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00163/abstract 
Dumas, G. (2014). Towards a two-body neuroscience. Communicative & Integrative 
Biology, 4(3), 349–352. http://doi.org/10.4161/cib.4.3.15110 
22 
Dumas, G., Martinerie, J., Soussignan, R., & Nadel, J. (2012). Does the brain know 
who is at the origin of what in an imitative interaction? Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00128 
Dumas, G., Nadel, J., Soussignan, R., Martinerie, J., & Garnero, L. (2010). Inter-
Brain Synchronization during Social Interaction. Plos One, 5(8), e12166–10. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012166 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizzolatti, G. (1995). Motor facilitation during 
action observation: a magnetic stimulation study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
73(6), 2608–2611. 
Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, F., & Johnson, M. H. (2002). Eye contact detection in 
humans from birth. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 99(14), 9602–9605. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.152159999 
Farroni, T., Massaccesi, S., Menon, E., & Johnson, M. H. (2007). Direct gaze 
modulates face recognition in young infants. Cognition, 102(3), 396–404. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2006.01.007 
Farroni, T., Massaccesi, S., Pividori, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2004). Gaze Following in 
Newborns. Infancy, 5(1), 39–60. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327078in0501_2 
Friedman, M. S. (1955). Martin Buber: the life of dialogue. 
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of 
mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(12), 493–501. 
Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). What is so special about embodied simulation? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(11), 512–519. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003 
23 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the 
premotor cortex. Brain, 119(2), 593–610. 
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: the philosophy, psychology, and 
neuroscience of mindreading. Philosophy of mind series. Offord; New York. 
Grossmann, T., Johnson, M. H., Farroni, T., & Csibra, G. (2007). Social perception in 
the infant brain: gamma oscillatory activity in response to eye gaze. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2(4), 284–291. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsm025 
Grossmann, T., Parise, E., & Friederici, A. D. (2010). The detection of 
communicative signals directed at the self in infant prefrontal cortex. Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 4, 201. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00201 
Hamilton, A. F. de C. (2009). Research review: Goals, intentions and mental states: 
challenges for theories of autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
50(8), 881–892. 
Hari, R., Forss, N., Avikainen, S., Kirveskari, E., Salenius, S., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(1998). Activation of human primary motor cortex during action observation: a 
neuromagnetic study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 95(25), 15061–15065. 
Heimann, K., & Uithol, S. (2015). Participation Over Observation: The Roots of 
Action Understanding in Attunement. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(1-
2), 45–48. 
Heyes, C. M. (2010). Where do mirror neurons come from? Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews. 
24 
Hickok, G. (2009). Eight Problems for the Mirror Neuron Theory of Action 
Understanding in Monkeys and Humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
21(7), 1229–1243. 
Hoehl, S., Michel, C., Reid, V. M., Parise, E., & Striano, T. (2014). Eye contact 
during live social interaction modulates infants’ oscillatory brain activity. Social 
Neuroscience, 9(3), 300–308. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2014.884982 
Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (2014). What are you doing? How active and 
observational experience shape infants' action understanding. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 
369(1644), 20130490–20130490. http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0490 
Hurley, K. B., & Oakes, L. M. (2015). Experience and Distribution of Attention: Pet 
Exposure and Infants’ Scanning of Animal Images. Journal of Cognition and 
Development, 16(1), 11–30. http://doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2013.833922 
Iacoboni, M., & Dapretto, M. (2006). The mirror neuron system and the consequences 
of its dysfunction. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 7(12), 942–951. 
Jones, S. S. (2009). The development of imitation in infancy. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 364(1528), 2325–
2335. http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0045 
Kadar, E. E., & Effken, J. A. (2005). From discrete actors to goal-directed actions: 
toward a process-based methodology for psychology. Philosophical 
Psychology, 18(3), 353–382. http://doi.org/10.1080/09515080500177358 
Kampe, K. K. W., Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2003). “Hey John”: Signals Conveying 
Communicative Intention toward the Self Activate Brain Regions Associated 
with ‘Mentalizing,’ Regardless of Modality. Journal of Neuroscience, 23(12), 
5268–5263. 
25 
Kanakogi, Y., & Itakura, S. (2011). Developmental correspondence between action 
prediction and motor ability in early infancy. Nature Communications, 2, 341. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1342 
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217–
250. 
Kourtis, D., Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2013). History of interaction and task 
distribution modulate action simulation. Neuropsychologia, 51(7), 1240–1247. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.04.001 
Kourtis, D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2010). Favouritism in the motor system: 
social interaction modulates action simulation. Biology Letters, 6(6), 758–761. 
http://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2010.0478 
Kugiumutzakis, G. (1998). Neonatal imitation in the intersubjective companion space. 
In S. Braten, Intersubjective communication and emotion in early ontogeny (pp. 
63–88). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Leavens, D. A., Sansone, J., Burfield, A., Lightfoot, S., Oâ Hara, S., & Todd, B. K. 
(2014). Putting the “Joy”  in joint attention: affective-gestural synchrony by 
parents who point for their babies. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00879 
Leudar, I., & Costall, A. (2009). Against theory of mind. Basingstoke [England] ; 
New York : Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers. (D. 
Cartwright). New York, Harper. 
Markova, G., & Legerstee, M. (2006). Contingency, imitation, and affect sharing: 
Foundations of infants' social awareness. Developmental Psychology, 42(1), 
132–141. http://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.1.132 
26 
Markova, I. (1982). Paradigms, thoughtand language. Chichester: Wiley. Markus. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1978.tb00405.x/abstract 
McGann, M., De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2013). Enaction and psychology. 
Review of General Psychology, 17(2), 203–209. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0032935 
McQuaid, N., Bibok, M., & Carpendale, J. (2009). Relation between maternal 
contingent responsiveness and infant social expectations. Infancy, 14(3), 390–
401. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Keith Moore, M. (1994). Imitation, memory, and the 
representation of persons. Infant Behavior and Development, 17(1), 83–99. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0163-6383(94)90024-8 
Mireault, G., Poutre, M., Sargent Hier, M., Dias, C., Perdue, B., & Myrick, A. (2012). 
Humour Perception and Creation between Parents and 3  to 6 month old 
Infants. Infant and Child Development, 21(4), 338–347. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/icd.757 
Mukamel, R., Ekstrom, A., Kaplan, J., Iacoboni, M., & Fried, I. (2010). Single-
Neuron Responses in Humans during Execution and Observation of Actions. 
Current Biology, 20(8), 750–756. 
Nadel, J., Carchon, I., Kervella, C., Marcelli, D., & Réserbat Plantey, D. (1999). 
Expectancies for social contingency in 2 month olds. Developmental Science, 
2(2), 164–173. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00065 
Nagels, A., Kircher, T., Steines, M., & Straube, B. (2015). Feeling addressed! The 
role of body orientation and co speech gesture in social communication. 
Human Brain Mapping, n/a–n/a. http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22746 
27 
Nagy, E., & Molnar, P. (2004). Homo imitans or homo provocans? Human imprinting 
model of neonatal imitation. Infant Behavior and Development, 27(1), 54–63. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2003.06.004 
Newman-Norlund, R. D., Van Schie, H. T., Van Zuijlen, A., & Bekkering, H. (2007). 
The mirror neuron system is more active during complementary compared with 
imitative action. Nature Neuroscience, 10(7), 817–818. 
Oberman, L. M., Pineda, J. A., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2007). The human mirror 
neuron system: a link between action observation and social skills. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2(1), 62–66. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsl022 
Parise, E., Reid, V. M., Stets, M., & Striano, T. (2008). Direct eye contact influences 
the neural processing of objects in 5-month-old infants. Social Neuroscience, 
3(2), 141–150. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701865458 
Raczaszek-Leonardi, J. (2013). Young children’s dialogical actions:The beginnings of 
purposeful intersubjectivity, 1–14. 
Reddy, V. (2003). On being the object of attention: implications for self-other 
consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(9), 397–402. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00191-8 
Reddy, V. (2008). How Infants Know Minds. Harvard University Press. 
Reddy, V. (2011). A gaze at grips with me. In Joint Attention New developments in 
psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience (pp. 137–157). 
Cambridge, MA: Joint Attention: New Developments in ….
Reddy, V. (2015). Joining intentions in infancy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
22(1-2), 24–44. 
28 
Reddy, V., Chisholm, V., Forrester, D., Conforti, M., & Maniatopoulou, D. (2007). 
Facing the perfect contingency: Interactions with the self at 2 and 3 months. 
Infant Behavior and Development, 30, 195–212. 
Reddy, V., Markova, G., & Wallot, S. (2013). Anticipatory Adjustments to Being 
Picked Up in Infancy. Plos One, 8(6), e65289. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0065289 
Reid, V. M., Striano, T., Kaufman, J., & Johnson, M. H. (2004). Eye gaze cueing 
facilitates neural processing of objects in 4-month-old infants. NeuroReport, 
15(16), 2553–2555. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The functional role of the parieto-frontal 
mirror circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Reviews: 
Neuroscience, 11(4), 264–274. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the 
recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3(2), 131–142. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms 
underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews: 
Neuroscience, 2, 661–670. 
Rossmanith, N., Costall, A., Reichelt, A. F., LÃ³pez, B., Lopez, B., & Reddy, V. 
(2014). Jointly structuring triadic spaces of meaning and action: book sharing 
from 3 months on. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1390. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01390 
Schilbach, L., Eickhoff, S. B., Mojzisch, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008). What's in a 
smile? Neural correlates of facial embodiment during social interaction. Social 
Neuroscience, 3(1), 37–50. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701563228 
29 
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & 
Vogeley, K. (2013). Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 36(04), 393–414. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12000660 
Schilbach, L., Wohlschlaeger, A. M., Kraemer, N. C., Newen, A., Shah, N. J., Fink, 
G. R., & Vogeley, K. (2006). Being with virtual others: Neural correlates of 
social interaction. Neuropsychologia, 44(5), 718–730. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.07.017 
Schnell, K., Bluschke, S., Konradt, B., & Walter, H. (2011). Functional relations of 
empathy and mentalizing: an fMRI study on the neural basis of cognitive 
empathy. NeuroImage, 54(2), 1743–1754. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.08.024 
Schurger, A. A., & Uithol, S. (2015). Nowhere and everywhere: The causal origin of 
voluntary action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 
Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2008). Gaze Following in Human Infants Depends on 
Communicative Signals. Current Biology, 18(9), 668–671. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2008.03.059 
Shenoy, K. V., Kaufman, M. T., Sahani, M., & Churchland, M. M. (2011). A 
dynamical systems view of motor preparation: Implications for neural prosthetic 
system design. Progress in Brain Research, 192, 33–58. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53355-5.00003-8 
Sommerville, J. A., Woodward, A. L., & Needham, A. (2005). Action experience 
alters 3-month-old infants“ perception of others” actions. Cognition, 96(1), B1–
B11. 
30 
Southgate, V. (2013). Does infant behaviour provide support for the mirror neuron 
theory of action understanding? Consciousness and Cognition, 22(3), 1114–
1121. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.008 
Sroufe, L. A., & Wunsch, J. P. (1972). The development of laughter in the first year 
of life. Child Development, 43(4), 1326–1344. 
Striano, T., Kopp, F., Grossmann, T., & Reid, V. M. (2006). Eye contact influences 
neural processing of emotional expressions in 4-month-old infants. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1(2), 87–94. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsl008 
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development 
of cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Trevarthen, C. (1977). Descriptive analyses of infant communication behaviour. In H. 
R. Schaffer, Studies on mother-infant interaction (pp. 227–270). London. 
Uithol, S., & Paulus, M. (2013). What do infants understand of others’ action? A 
theoretical account of early social cognition. Psychological Research, 78(5), 
609–622. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-013-0519-3 
Uithol, S., Burnston, D., & Haselager, W. F. G. (2014). Why we may not find 
intentions in the brain. Neuropsychologia, 56, 129–139. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.01.010 
Uithol, S., van Rooij, I., Bekkering, H., & Haselager, W. F. G. (2011). Understanding 
motor resonance. Social Neuroscience, 6(4), 388–397. 
Uzgiris, I. C. (1981). Two Functions of Imitation During Infancy. International 
Journal of Behavioral Development, 4(1), 1–12. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/016502548100400101 
31 
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's 
reach. Cognition, 69(1), 1–34. 
Woodward, A. L., & Gerson, S. A. (2014). Mirroring and the development of action 
understanding. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological 
Sciences, 369(1644), 20130181–20130181. 
http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0181 
Woodward, A. L., & Guajardo, J. J. (2002). Infants’ understanding of the point 
gesture as an object-directed action. Cognitive Development. 
Yu, C., & Smith, L. B. (2012). Embodied attention and word learning by toddlers. 
Cognition, 125(2), 244–262. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.016 
